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Falling fertility rates have often been linked to rising female wages. However, over the 
last 40 years the US total fertility rate has been rather stable while female wages have 
continued to grow. Over the same period, women’s hours spent on housework have 
declined, but men’s have increased. I propose a model in which households are not 
perfectly specialized, but both men and women contribute to home production. As the 
gender wage gap narrows, the time allocations of men and women converge, and while 
fertility falls at ﬁrst, the decline stops when female wages are close to male’s. Rising 
relative wages increase women’s labor supply and due to higher opportunity cost lower 
fertility at ﬁrst, but they also lead to a reallocation of home production and child care from 
women to men, and a marketization. I ﬁnd that both are important in understanding why 
fertility did not decline further. In a further quantitative exercise I show that the model 
performs well in matching fertility over the entire 20th century, including the overall 
decline, the baby boom, and the recent stabilization.
 2017 The Author. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC 
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Between the 1960s and today, we have seen enormous changes to the economic and demographic structure in all West-
ern countries. There has been a decline in total fertility rates2 and an increase in women’s market hours (see Figs. 1 and 2
for US data).
Many authors explain both with a rise in female wages (e.g. Galor and Weil, 1996; Doepke et al., 2015). An apparent 
puzzle, however, is that while female wages and market hours have continued to grow, since the early 1970s fertility has 
stopped falling.3 Understanding the underlying fertility decisions is important since they affect population growth, labor 
force composition and social security systems, and thereby economic outcomes. In this paper I argue that the common 
driving force behind the trends in fertility and in female employment is the narrowing of the gender wage gap (shown in 
Fig. 3), rather than the level of female wages per se, since it changes the division of labor within the family. The explanation 
E-mail address: C.Siegel@kent.ac.uk.
1 This is a substantially revised version of a chapter of my PhD thesis at the London School of Economics entitled ‘Female Employment and Fertility: The 
Effects of Rising Female Wages’. I am grateful to Francesco Caselli for his advise on this project. I would also like to thank two anonymous referees, the 
editor Matthias Doepke, Zsóﬁa Bárány, Wouter den Haan, Monique Ebell, Paula Gobbi, Moshe Hazan, Ethan Ilzetzki, Winfried Koeniger, John Knowles, Rigas 
Oikonomou, Albert Marcet, Michael McMahon, Rachel Ngai, Silvana Tenreyro, as well as seminar and conference participants at Bonn, Cologne, Exeter, LSE, 
Uppsala, the SED 2013 meeting in Seoul and the Demographic Economics Conference at the University of Iowa for many comments and suggestions.
2 The total fertility rate (TFR) is the average number of children that would be born if all women lived to the end of their childbearing years and bore 
children according to the current age-speciﬁc birth rates.
3 Most of the recent rise in the oﬃcial total fertility rate is driven by the effects of immigration. For US-born women the increase is much less and 
fertility virtually flat since the late 1970s. The details on the decomposition of TFR by mothers’ birthplace are given in the online appendix, section A.1.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2017.01.010
1094-2025/ 2017 The Author. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Fig. 1. Male and female market hours. This graph shows average (per capita) yearly market hours worked for men and women aged 20 to 60. The data is 
taken from the PSID and refers to self-reported hours worked in the previous year. In the panel on the left, all individuals of age 20 to 60 are included. 
The panels to the right restrict the sample to married and to single individuals respectively. Per capita hours worked are computed as the simple average 
of the average hours worked in 5-year age bins, in order to take out a potential composition effect due to changing cohort sizes.
Fig. 2. Total fertility rate and children ever born. In the left panel, the red dashed line shows the oﬃcial total fertility rate (TFR) for the United States, taken 
from the World Bank (based on national statistics and the United Nations Demographic Yearbook), and the blue solid line the author’s computation of TFR 
for US-born women, based on the Vital Statistics of the United States combined with population estimates from the US Census; see online appendix for 
details. The right panel shows children ever born to women of age 40 to 44; the blue dashed line for all women of age 40 to 44, the red solid line and the 
green dot-dashed line the breakdown for ever married and never married women respectively. The data is taken from the United States Census Bureau’s 
Fertility Data Historical Time Series and based on the CPS.
I propose is based on imperfect specialization of households, such that both men and women contribute to home and 
market production, implying that a reallocation has a nonlinear effect.
My explanation is based on the observation that men’s home hours have increased, allowing women’s home hours 
to fall. In the 1960s, when the wage gap was large, the catching up of female wages increased women’s labor supply. 
The associated increase in the opportunity cost of women’s time, who shouldered most of child care, lowered fertility, as 
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Fig. 3. Female relative wages. Ratio of median female to male hourly wages, computed in a PSID subsample of men and women aged 20 to 60 who work 
at least one hour in paid employment and report positive earnings.
argued by Becker (1960) or Galor and Weil (1996). But as relative wages become more equal over time, specialization in 
the household decreases. Consequently, male home hours increase, a father’s time at home becomes more important for 
raising children, and the allocation of time between home and market work becomes more evenly balanced for men and 
women. I show that when the complementarity between mother’s and father’s time working at home is suﬃciently large, 
the marginal utility cost of having an additional child can become constant, or even fall, despite women working more 
hours in the market.
Circumstantial evidence in favor of this mechanism is provided by data on non-market hours. Using data from Aguiar 
and Hurst (2007), based on the American Time Use Survey since 1965, I show the trends in hours spent working at home in 
Fig. 4. I focus on the sum of time spent non-market work, deﬁned by Aguiar and Hurst as home production plus obtaining 
goods, and basic child care.4 The data displays a shift in household production from women to men, with an overall reduc-
tion of hours worked at home. As a consequence, the ratio of married men’s to married women’s hours devoted to working 
at home rose from 0.25 to 0.54 over 1965–2003. There has also been a shift in time investments into children. Sayer et 
al. (2004) ﬁnd in time diary data that the ratio of married mothers’ to married fathers’ time in child care declined in all 
primary child care activities since mid-1960s. This is consistent with the facts documented by Robinson and Godbey (2008), 
who ﬁnd in time use data over 1965–1995 evidence for convergence in activities across gender.5 The tendencies for men 
and women’s time spent on home production to converge have been at work throughout the last century, as documented 
by Ramey (2009).
The importance of considering intrahousehold allocations can be seen in the right panels of Fig. 4. While home hours of 
married men have increased over time, single men’s hours of home production are constant, after an initial change between 
1965 and 1975. This is consistent with the explanation I propose. Single men, who are without a female partner, are not 
affected by rising female wages, whereas married men spend more hours working at home – a trend in US data that has 
not received much attention by researchers yet, with the notable exception of Knowles (2013).6 Single women, on the other 
hand, spend less time working at home, but the decline is not as pronounced as for married women, whose husbands 
devote more of their time to home production.7
Distinguishing household types is also important in the fertility data. Fig. 2 shows that the total fertility rate (left panel) 
has been rather stable over the last forty years (and even increased slightly) and that the number children ever born (CEB) 
for women of age 40–44 (right panel) has been flat for the last 25 years.8 However, the trends in CEB for ever-married and 
4 The measure is constructed as weekly hours spent on home production in a narrow sense, on obtaining goods, and on basic child care. Arguably, for 
many people child care is an activity that is more enjoyable than other forms of housework. Excluding child care from the measure of market work does 
not change the qualitative trends. This can be seen in the regression results of Table A-1 in the online appendix.
5 They also report that average parental hours spent on child-care per child has been roughly constant. Ramey and Ramey (2010), on the other hand, 
include time spent teaching children and document a rise since the mid-1990s, especially for college educated parents.
6 Burda et al. (2007) study time use data across various developed countries, and ﬁnd that total work, the sum of home and market work, is virtually 
the same for men and women. For the US, Ramey and Francis (2009) report that total work of men and women has been constant throughout the 20th 
century.
7 In the Aguiar and Hurst (2007) data marital status is deﬁned in a legal sense, and it is not possible to disentangle cohabiting from other singles. In 
Fig. A-4 of the online appendix I show that home hours have changed more for singles with children (who are more likely to be cohabiting) than for singles 
without children.
8 CEB has flattened out only from 1990 on, since it shows life-time fertility of women aged 40–44, whereas TFR is a measure of fertility across women 
of all ages at a point in time. Since TFR is computed by adding up the age-speciﬁc fertility rates of all women (in their child-bearing years), it is potentially 
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Fig. 4. Male and female home hours worked. This graph shows average (per capita) weekly hours spent on nonmarket work and basic child care for men 
and women aged 20 to 60. The data is taken from Aguiar and Hurst (2007). Per capita hours worked are computed as the simple average of the average 
hours worked in 5-year age bins, in order to take out a potential composition effect due to changing cohort sizes.
never-married women differ substantially. While overall fertility has been flat, there has been an increase in the fertility of 
never married women. However, the rise in single women’s fertility is not the sole driver of the flattening out in aggregate 
data. To the contrary, the total ﬁgure of children ever born follows more closely the number for ever-married women, which 
has been stable for the last 25 years. Understanding the evolution of married fertility is the focus of this paper.
I present a model matching the observed patterns of married fertility and hours worked through an exogenous decrease 
in the gender wage gap. As the main interest of this paper is in understanding the recent time series of fertility, starting with 
the ﬁrst available time use data in 1965, I abstract from many factors that might have been important for the fertility decline 
in earlier periods, such as a reduction in infant mortality or quality–quantity considerations in the wake of technological 
changes during the 19th century (Becker et al., 1990; Galor and Weil, 2000). However, in an extension I show that the model 
– under parameters calibrated to 1965–2005 – performs well in replicating the whole 20th century data. Moreover, since 
the focus is on the time series, I do not model heterogeneity within a cohort. Nonetheless it is worth noting that Hazan and 
Zoabi (2015) ﬁnd in recent U.S. cross-sectional data that fertility is not monotonically declining in women’s education, but 
U-shaped.
For each cohort I consider a representative household that maximizes the sum of a male and a female member’s utilities. 
Both members can work in the market and at home. Due to complementaries in home production the household is not 
perfectly specialized. When women’s wages are lower than men’s, they contribute more time to home production. A rise in 
female relative wages directly increases female labor supply and lowers female home production, whereas more male time 
is devoted to home activities and less to market work. Initially, when the gender wage gap is large, there is an overall drop 
in home labor and a couple devotes less time to having and raising children.
However, when the gender wage gap is fairly small and shrinks further, fertility stabilizes and might even increase. 
The reason for this differential reaction to improvement in female relative wages is in the degree to which households are 
specialized. Initially, a husband’s labor supply was much higher than his wife’s, and his time spent working at home much 
lower than hers. As a consequence, the opportunity cost of having children was largely determined by her wage (which was 
low compared to his), and when female wages improved the cost of having children increased substantially. In this situation 
the substitution effect of higher female wages dominates the positive income effect, leading to a fall in fertility. But as 
relative wages become more equal, the increase in the opportunity cost of having children becomes smaller, since the cost 
subject to a tempo effect, which is that an increase in the age of childbearing mechanically lowers the computed total fertility rate. CEB is not affected by 
changes in the timing of fertility, as it measures actually completed fertility. In general, TFR and CEB follow similar trends though.
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of reallocating home production from the wife to the husband falls. As a consequence, the substitution effect weakens with 
the narrowing of the gender wage gap. On top of this, with the improvement in the wife’s earnings, a couple can acquire 
more parental time-saving inputs, and the larger her labor supply already is, the more the household gains when her wage 
increases.
Both the rise in male home labor and the higher use of parental time-saving inputs into home production is what I 
ﬁnd key in explaining why the fertility decline ended. First I use a simpliﬁed model to show analytically that the combined 
substitution effect becomes weaker than the income effect before the gender wage gap has fully closed if complementaries 
between both parents’ time spent in the household are suﬃciently strong and if marketization is possible. Then I calibrate 
the full model to study the quantitative implications, which suggest further that the degree of marketization is important 
for the timing of the fertility stabilization.
To the best of my knowledge, the only previous paper that has noted the flattening out in total fertility rates and 
informally suggested an explanation in terms of increased male home production is Feyrer et al. (2008).9 My paper formally 
models and quantiﬁes the endogenous response of male and female hours and their implications for fertility. In a working 
paper Regalia and Ríos-Rull (1999) discuss the stability in fertility and use a rich model to assess the effects of changes in 
wage premia, including the gender wage gap, for fertility decisions. My paper differs along two margins. On the one hand, 
focusing on married fertility, I assume that the number of children is a joint decision the couple takes. On the other hand, 
since both parents can contribute to home production, the implicit cost of having children is endogenous and a function of 
both parents’ wages.
Other papers that have studied the implications of the decline in the gender wage gap for both male and female hours 
include Jones et al. (2003) and Knowles (2013), who highlights the rise of male home production and on whose work I build. 
In a calibrated life-cycle model Attanasio et al. (2008) ﬁnd that a reduction in the gender wage gap alone cannot explain the 
change in labor supply of young mothers and that also a fall in the cost of children is needed. However, none of these papers 
have explored the implications for fertility. In my model, the rise of men’s time spent on home production – in response to 
improved female wages – endogenously lowers mothers’ cost of having children and the fertility decline ends.10 Galor and 
Weil (1996) present a uniﬁed framework to explain the rise in female employment and the fall in fertility that we observed 
until the early 1970s. Since their mechanism links fertility decisions to the market value of women’s disposable time,11 it 
cannot explain why fertility stopped falling when female wages continued improving. My work therefore highlights that the 
existing literature that assumes perfect specialization within families, such that women shoulder all of home production or 
child care, has overlooked important implications of intrahousehold allocations.
2. Cross-sectional time use data
To support the view that the reallocation of home production from women to men is linked to relative wages, I use 
data from the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) for the year 2011, provided by Hofferth et al. (2013). The ATUS provides 
data on the time use of only the respondents themselves but not of other family members. It is therefore not possible to 
directly study how home production chores are split within a household. However as the ATUS respondents are sampled 
from individuals who completed the Current Population Survey (CPS), it is possible to link the respondents’ time use data to 
the previous CPS data which include labor market characteristics of both the respondent and their partner. The lag between 
the ATUS and CPS interviews spans between 2 and 5 month, with an average of around 3 month.
I restrict the sample to married or cohabiting couples in which both partners are of age 21 to 65, and drop households 
with family businesses. To compute hourly wages for both partners, I divide weekly earnings by usual hours worked. As in 
Fig. 4, I deﬁne time spent working at home as the sum of home production, purchasing goods, and caring for household 
members.12 Then I regress individuals’ home work on their own and their partner’s labor market characteristics, which 
come from the earlier CPS sample, and a set of other controls including number of children in the household. Denoting 
individual i’s time spent on household production by hi , I estimate







where bi are the number of children living in the household, and X
o
i
individual i’s own and X s
i
their spouses’ labor market 
characteristics, such as market hours worked, hourly wages, and weekly earnings (all taken from the previous CPS). Table 1
shows the results for different speciﬁcations.
9 Feyrer et al. (2008) explain the increase in male home hours with intrahousehold bargaining. I show that bargaining is not necessary; a change in 
relative wages per se implies not only a reallocation of work in the market, but also at home.
10 Attanasio et al. (2008) report that data on child care costs are not consistently available before 1980. For that reason, they calibrate the drop in the 
price of market child care using their model. Since they assume that only mothers provide domestic child care, they are likely to overstate the required 
reduction in child care costs as they do not take into account responses in fathers’ time.
11 Other papers linking fertility decisions to the market value of women’s disposable time include Greenwood et al. (2005) and Doepke et al. (2015), 
besides others.
12 In the ATUS, the respondents answer how many minutes they have spent on the various activities over a 24-hour period.
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Table 1
Cross-sectional regressions of time spent on home production.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Nbr. of kids in Hh 59.11*** 60.04*** 59.39*** 61.69*** 62.02*** 61.91*** 60.31*** 62.46***
(7.01) (8.00) (7.34) (8.15) (7.22) (8.35) (7.98) (8.06)
(Nbr. of kids in Hh)2 −8.81*** −8.55*** −9.09*** −8.97*** -8.93*** −8.57*** −8.67*** −9.12***
(2.02) (2.35) (2.11) (2.39) (2.03) (2.40) (2.34) (2.36)
Own market hours −2.98*** −2.69*** −2.91*** −2.71***
(0.28) (0.36) (0.28) (0.36)
Spouse’s market hours 1.88*** 2.06*** 1.77*** 2.02***
(0.30) (0.39) (0.30) (0.39)
Own wage −0.39 −0.49* −0.46
(0.28) (0.29) (0.29)
Spouse’s wage 0.66*** 0.65*** 0.54**
(0.22) (0.23) (0.23)
Own earnings −0.03*** −0.03***
(0.01) (0.01)
Spouse’s earnings 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01)
Own age −1.82** −2.62***
(0.72) (0.81)
Spouse’s age 2.55*** 2.94***
(0.72) (0.82)
Constant 204.76*** 174.74*** 145.56*** 148.55*** 174.17*** 137.35*** 183.74*** 143.65***
(17.51) (23.96) (8.41) (8.96) (23.07) (18.96) (22.53) (9.16)
Race dummies No No No No Yes Yes No No
Sample All Empl All Empl All Empl Empl Empl
Observations 2691 2108 2417 2108 2691 2108 2108 2108
R2 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.08
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The results of column 1 imply that individuals who work longer hours in the market tend to spend less time on home 
production. However, ceteris paribus, they spend more time on home production if their partner works more. The relation-
ship is robust to include wages or age as further covariates, as seen in columns 2 and 5 respectively.
Moreover, columns 3, 4 and 6 show that individuals tend to devote less time to household production if they have 
higher hourly wages or weekly earnings, but more if their spouse earns more. Using wages in the analysis restricts the 
sample to households in which both the respondent and their spouse are working and wages are observed. Due to a 
potential self-selection into labor market participation, the result for the interdependence between home production time 
and spouses’ wages are potentially not representative for the overall population. However, the results for the relationship 
with market hours worked (column 1) and with earnings (column 3) include households in which a spouse is not in 
employment. Excluding observations with zero market hours or earnings to restrict the sample to couples in which both 
are employed, gives the results in columns 7 and 8. For the correlation between home hours and market hours, or earnings, 
whether to include individuals out of employment, or not, does not matter much for the results.
To summarize, Table 1 highlights that married individuals’ time allocated to home production depends not only on their 
own labor market characteristics, but also on their spouses’.13 These results are in line with the conjecture that higher 
female wages, or higher female market hours, are associated with a reduction in women’s time in home production and an 
increase in their husband’s home hours.
To the extent that better educated women earn higher wages, this is consistent with Hazan and Zoabi (2015)’s ﬁnding 
that married men’s time spent providing childcare at home increases with mothers’ education. However Hazan and Zoabi
do not explore the implications of fathers’ time for the fertility decision. In the next section I propose a model in which 




To explain the time series of fertility as well as of male and female time allocations for married individuals, I propose 
a parsimonious model. For tractability I assume that each cohort can be represented by a representative married couple 
13 Splitting the regression sample by the gender of the respondent does not change the general pattern; see online appendix A.4.
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household that decides on how to allocate male and female time and on a continuous number of children to have. In the 
main text I focus on a version in which the couple lives for one period only, such that their choices are static. In the online 
appendix I present a life-cycle version of this model and show quantitatively that the general conclusions regarding fertility 
and time allocations remain the same. The advantage of the simple model presented in the main text is that it allows for 
an analytical characterization of the mechanism that links fertility to women’s relative wages.
3.1.1. Agents and households
All agents, men and women, derive utility from the consumption of a market good (c), from having children (b), and 
from leisure, which is the time spent neither working in the labor market (n) or at home (h). Each individual is endowed 
with one unit of time. Agents differ in terms of their gender (g ∈ {m, f }) and their age ( j). I assume that all economic active 
men and women live in couple households, formed by one man (‘husband’) and one woman (‘wife’).
I apply a model of collective household behavior, as introduced by Chiappori (1988). The male and the female partner 
have their own preferences, and derive felicity um and u f respectively. Since they have children together, they solve a joint 
maximization problem. In particular, the couple household solves a Pareto program with relative weight θ attached to the 
husband’s and 1 − θ to the wife’s utility. As will be seen later, under the model assumption made the spouses’ relative 
time spent on home production is independent of the bargaining weight, but solely based on comparative advantage. As a 
consequence, θ has no effect on the implicit cost of having children. I therefore restrict attention to the unitary model with 
θ = 0.5 throughout.
3.1.2. Fertility
Child-care requires more home production (x), which could be done by the father, the mother, or both.14 A further 
input to home production are goods acquired in the market (e). Although I refer to this home-labor saving input as home 
appliances, in a broader sense this could include paid domestic help, such as hiring nannies. I assume that the amount of 
the home good needed is
x¯(b)= κ0 + κ1b
κ2 (1)
with κ0, κ1, κ2 > 0, which implies x¯
′(b) > 0.
3.1.3. Household production
Following Olivetti (2006) and in particular Knowles (2013), I assume that the home good is produced using a technology 
that is consistent with substitution among household member’s time and home appliances according to
x= eγ H1−γ , (2)











and zm and z f are the male and female home labor productivities. The parameter ρ > 0 is the inverse of the elasticity of 
substitution between male and female inputs. For ﬁnite ρ , this deﬁnition of H as a CES aggregator allows for substitutability 
between male and female inputs to home production – as long as both zm > 0 and z f > 0.
With γ > 0, this technology allows, to some degree, for a marketization of inputs to home production.15 Moreover, this 
home production function is consistent with the ﬁndings by Ramey (2009). From regressing the home capital–labor ratio 
on appliances prices, Ramey ﬁnds that the production function is more or less consistent with a Cobb–Douglas technology 
over home capital and labor.
3.1.4. Preferences
Agents derive utility from consuming the market good, from having children, and from leisure time. In particular, assume 
that preferences are additively separable and given by16
u(cg,ng,hg,b)= log(cg)+ φl







where cg , ng , and hg are speciﬁc to a spouse g ∈ {m, f }, but the number of children b is common to the couple.
14 The former assumption is similar to Erosa et al. (2010), the latter is as in Knowles (2007) and similar to Greenwood and Seshadri (2005).
15 In a structural transformation framework, Ngai and Pissarides (2008) study substitutions between home and market production, but do not distinguish 
between male and female labor.
16 Adding utility from children in this additive form is generalizing Galor and Weil (1996) and Greenwood and Seshadri (2005), who assume ln(b).
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Note that in this model setup individuals derive utility from leisure, i.e. the time spent not working in the market or at 
home, and both spouses contribute to home production due to complementaries.17
I assume that there is a subsistence level in consumption of the home produced good, which is increasing in the number 
of children living in the household (b). As a simplifying assumption, following Knowles (2007), agents do not derive any 
further utility from home production, and this constraint will be binding, x = x¯(b).
3.2. Couple household’s optimization
The representative couple household maximizes the sum of male and female utilities, by choosing male and female hours 
of home production and of market labor supply and how many children to have, subject to a budget constraint, the home 
production requirement (1) and the home production technology (2). The household can earn a labor income wmnm+w f n f , 
where wm is the male wage and w f the female wage, which can be used to purchase consumption goods, cm and c f , and 
time-saving inputs to home production, e.
The representative couple’s maximization problem is therefore given by
max
cm,c f ,b,e
nm,n f ,hm,h f
θum(cm,nm,hm,b)+ (1− θ)u f (c f ,n f ,h f ,b) (5)
subject to the constraint set:











nm + hm ≤ 1 and n f + h f ≤ 1 (8)
ng ≥ 0 and hg ≥ 0 for g ∈ {m, f } (9)
where (6) is the household’s budget constraint and (7) the relationship between the required amount of the home good 
and the home production inputs. The inequalities in (8) constrain the male and female total time working in the market 
and at home to be no larger than the time endowment of 1. As the marginal utility of leisure goes to inﬁnity when leisure 
goes to zero, these constraints will be slack for both spouses. The inequalities in (9) are non-negativity conditions on the 
spouses’ time spent working in the market and at home. As the home production function (3) features complementarity 
between male and female home hours, optimality requires hm and h f to be positive and the associated constraints never 
bind. The non-negativity constraints on market hours could in principle bind, but since I focus on a representative couple, 
I will choose parameter values for which both nm and n f are positive (to capture the trends in Fig. 1). As a consequence 
all time constraint will be slack in equilibrium and I will focus throughout on interior solutions. Also note that since I am 
focusing on a representative couple, the household can choose any non-negative continuous quantity of children b.
Combining (7) with (6), the effective budget constraint to the household’s maximization problem can be written as












= wmnm + w f n f (10)

































































17 In an earlier working paper version, Siegel (2012), I had proposed an alternative to generate imperfect specialization within the household based on 
preferences featuring imperfect substitutability in the disutilities from working at home or in the market. Both models generate qualitatively the same 
predictions for the effects of changing relative wages on the couple’s time allocation and on the fertility choice.
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Equations (10) to (16) fully characterize the couple’s utility maximizing choices. When choosing a fertility plan, the 
couple is outweighing beneﬁts and costs from having children. The left-hand side in (16) is the marginal beneﬁt of having 
an additional child, which at the optimum has to equal the marginal cost (in utility terms), the right-hand side. The term 























ρ−1 is the minimal cost to produce one unit of the home good x. The 
marginal cost of having more children lies in the need for more home production. To increase home production, the couple 
devotes more time to home labor and uses more purchased inputs. Both adjustments reduce consumption of the parents. 
Notice that Cx(wm, w f ) is increasing in the male and female wage rates as these represent the opportunity cost of male 
and female home labor; devoting more time to home production lowers labor income and thereby reduces consumption. 
Since how costly it is to forgo consumption depends negatively on the original consumption level, the right-hand side of 
(16) is decreasing in cm . Ceteris paribus, higher wages imply an increase in the cost of having children, whereas higher 
consumption implies a lower cost.
Also note that Cx is independent of the bargaining weight θ . The reason for this is that the spouses’ relative time spent 
on home production is solely based on comparative advantage. From (12) and (13) it can be seen that the optimal ratio of 











3.3. Effect of higher female wages
When female relative wages improve, the couple ﬁnds it optimal to allocate a larger share of home production to the 
husband. Holding the number of children and the required amount of the home good constant, this leads to a reallocation 
of men’s time from market to home labor, and for women from home to market labor.
This impacts the marginal cost of having children in (16). Higher female wages directly increase the opportunity cost of 
home production, but they also improve labor income and thereby consumption. While the former channel tends to reduce 
fertility as the couple substitutes from having children towards consumption of market goods, the latter channel tends to 
increase it as the household experiences higher income and children are normal goods in the utility function. The ﬁrst effect 
is the substitution effect and the second one the income effect.
To derive a condition under which the substitution effect dominates and fertility falls, use the parametrization of home 
production requirement (1) to write the optimal number of children as
b=





















Note that (17) implies that, holding consumption constant fertility falls in response to higher wages (due to the substitution 
effect) only if σb + κ2 − 1 > 0, which is a restriction on parameters I will assume throughout. Consumption itself is pinned 
down by the budget constraint (10) given the optimal choices according to (11) to (15). In general this gives a system of 
two non-linear equations which has no closed form solution.
On the one hand, higher female wages increase the cost of home production, which induces a substitution effect that 
implies a reduction in fertility. But on the other hand, they also have a positive income effect, which implies an increase in 
consumption and in fertility. When Cx increases by more than cm , fertility falls. In the next subsection I focus on a special 
case, for which one can derive a closed-form solution for the couple’s optimal number of children. I show under what 
conditions fertility falls in response to higher female wages, and when it does not. In the subsection thereafter I show that 
the drawn conclusions generalize.
3.3.1. Special case: σb = 1 and φl = 0
Consider the special case of σb = 1 and φl = 0. This means that agents have log utility from children and do not value 
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The sign of ∂b
∂w f





















































No marketization: First, consider a scenario in which there is no marketization of home production by setting γ = 0. 
Then ∂b
∂w f






. Hence, higher female wages reduce fertility when women’s relative wages are low 
compared to their relative productivities at home. The reason is that when women’s comparative advantage lies in home 
production, the female share in the cost of children is larger than the female share in total income. This implies that higher 
female wages increase the cost of having children by more than household income. As a consequence, the substitution effect 
dominates the income effect, and fertility falls.
No male home production: Next, consider a scenario with marketization but without men contributing to home produc-
tion, which is nested as the optimal choice when zm = 0. Here, 
∂b
∂w f





γ . Thus, when the degree 
of marketization, as measured by γ , is suﬃciently low, higher female wages reduce fertility. When the usage of time-saving 
inputs is limited, the cost of home production increases by more than income. Intuitively this happens since there is a lack 
of possibilities to exploit the beneﬁts from higher female wages. Since there is no substitution with men’s time and sub-
stitution with purchased inputs is limited, women’s home hours cannot fall much; as a consequence her labor supply and 
the household’s income do not increase much. As a result, the substitution effect is stronger than the income effect. If one 
assumes that in the long-run female and male wages are equalized, a suﬃcient condition for fertility to always fall when 
female wages go up is γ < 1
2
. Hence, if there is no male home production and the degree of marketization is suﬃciently 
low, fertility always falls when women’s wages improve.
With marketization and male home production: When γ > 0 and zm > 0, and the home production technology allows 
both for marketization and for substitutability between male and female time, ∂b
∂w f















< 1− γ (19)
Since the left-hand side is increasing in 
w f
wm
, whereas the right-hand side is constant, this inequality is satisﬁed if and only if 
w f
wm
is suﬃciently low. This means that improvements in female wages reduce the optimal number of children only if female 
relative wages are suﬃciently low, echoing the conclusions drawn above. Notice that this inequality is more likely to hold 
when men’s relative productivity in home production is high. To understand how the degree of substitutability between 
male and female time affects this condition, consider ﬁrst a scenario where men and women have equal productivities 
at home (zm = z f ). In this case, the left-hand side of (19) increases in ρ for 
w f
wm
< 1. This implies that for larger ρ , 
i.e. when there are stronger complementarities between male and female time in home production, the fertility decline 
ends at a lower female relative wage threshold. When male and female home productivities differ, there is an additional 






. When zm < z f , which is a reasonable assumption for some child care tasks, this term 
depends positively on ρ , resulting in an additional channel through which the left-hand side of (19) increases in ρ .18 This 
implies that the larger the complementaries between male and female time at home, the earlier the fertility decline ends 
in response to improvements in women’s relative wages. With larger complementaries, the household gains more from 
increasing the husband’s home hours when the wife lowers hers; as a consequence the home production cost, Cx , increases 
less when w f rises.
The condition for the fertility decline to end is also more likely to be satisﬁed when the degree of marketization is 
higher. A larger γ means that the additional margin, the possibility to substitute between parental time and purchased 
inputs, is more important, which weakens the strength of the overall substitution effect on fertility relative to the income 
effect. From inequality (19) one can derive a suﬃcient condition that ensures a bottoming out of fertility. Fertility stops 





> 1− 2γ (20)
To summarize, fertility falls in response to higher female wages only if the gender wage gap is large. Moreover, both the 
substitution of female time spent in home production with male time as well as the substitution with inputs purchased in 






, making it 
less likely that inequality (19) is satisﬁed.
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the market are important. The fertility decline ends before the gender wage gap is fully closed, when men’s inputs to home 
production suﬃciently well complement female time and when there is a suﬃcient degree of marketization. Obviously, once 
fertility stops falling, it in general increases. Whether the model implies that overall fertility looks rather stable or more 
like a pronounced U-shape, is a quantitative question whose answer depends on other parameters, and on which I return 
in section 6.1.
3.3.2. Log-linearization of the general case (σb = 1)
To study the effect of higher female wages on the fertility decision in the more general case with σb = 1, I rely on a 
ﬁrst-order approximation. For tractability I continue to assume φl = 0, implying ng + hg = 1 for g ∈ {m, f }.
Given the optimal choices for female consumption and for the time allocations as a function of male consumption, 



























x¯(b)= wm + w f (21)
which pins down cm for a given number of children b. The household chooses b optimally according to (17). These two 
equations fully characterize the optimal choices.
As there is no closed form solution, I log-linearize the two equations. In particular, I consider the log deviations of a 
variable between this period and the previous one. To keep the notation simple, I denote previous period’s values by a tilde 
and log deviations between two periods by a hat; for a generic variable Z , the previous period’s values is Z˜ = Zt−1 , and the 




The log-linearization of the optimality condition for the fertility choice (17) gives
b̂=
1
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As the terms outside of these parentheses are necessarily positive, the crucial term is the one inside, which is the very same 
as in condition (18). Therefore, the conclusions drawn in subsection 3.3.1 above generalize to cases with σb = 1, as long as 
σb > 1 − κ2 (which is the parameter restriction ensuring a normal substitution effect). Higher female relative wages lower 
fertility when the gender wage gap is large, but the fertility decline might end before the gap is closed, depending on the 
properties of the home production technology. In the quantitative model calibrated in the next section, I ﬁnd that these 
results also go through when allowing for φl = 0.
4. Calibration
To quantitatively assess the effect of the narrowing of the gender wage gap on fertility, I calibrate the model. I choose 
parameters such that the model replicates in 1965 features of the data for married couples. I target married men’s and 
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married women’s hours worked, both at home and in the market, and an indicator for married fertility. All parameters are 
time-invariant, and the only exogenous change over time is in the gender wage gap. As the Aguiar and Hurst (2007) data is 
available once per decade, I study the choices of representative couples born ten years apart.
Below I ﬁrst discuss what data is targeted and then the choice of parameters. I calibrate the model in the following 
order: the home production function, the required amount of the home good, and the preference parameters.
4.1. Targets
To construct the targets, I need to map the hours worked data of Figs. 1 and 4 into the model. Since the model is about 
the decisions of prime-aged couples, I restrict the sample to married individuals of age 20 to 60. In the model, agents have 
a time endowment of one, which they can split between market work, home work, and leisure time. Assuming that people 
need 8 hours of rest a day, 2/3 of time is discretionary. Hence to map the weekly data from Aguiar and Hurst (2007) into my 
model, I divide all hours by (2/3 × 24 × 7). For market hours worked, I use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID) from 1968 to 2007, which I average over 10 year periods.19 Since in the PSID market hours worked are given per 
year, I divided these by (2/3 × 24 × 365). Not to confound trends in market and home hours with potential composition 
effects that could be due to demographic changes, I ﬁrst compute average hours for individuals at different ages in 5 year 
bins, and then take the simple average over the bins, which gives every age group the same weight.
As the theory I propose applies to couples, the model’s implications are for married fertility. Since the total fertility rate 
is constructed by age-speciﬁc birthrates, it does not allow for a break-down into unmarried and married fertility. I therefore 
use children-ever born to women at age 40–44, for which there is data by marital history (shown in the right panel of 
Fig. 2), published by the United States Census Bureau in the Fertility Data Historical Time Series.20 This is an indicator of 
completed fertility. However, most couples have children at an earlier point in their lives than at age 40–44 (and thereby 
take a decision under earlier wages). To construct an indicator for married fertility that corresponds to the model, I shift the 
series of children-ever born. I take the average number of children an ever-married women at age 40–44 ever had, and shift 
it back by 16 years, since the mean age of a mother when giving birth is 25.83 in the data.21 The drawback of this indicator 
for the married fertility choice is that the constructed series ends early; the model’s predictions cannot be evaluated against 
constructed data for 2005 (yet). However, one advantage of using this measure of completed fertility over other fertility 
indicators, such as the total fertility rate, is that it is not confounded by changes in the timing of births.
For the gender wage gap I take the ratio of median female to median male wages in the PSID, shown in Fig. 3. To feed 
it into the model, where a period corresponds to 10 years, I take simple averages.
4.2. Home production technology
I set the elasticity of substitution between male and female time spent in home production to replicate the rise in the 
ratio of married men’s home hours to married women’s observed in the data. In the model, equations (12) and (13) imply 










ρ ; their ratio between periods T and 0 is therefore 
hm,T /h f ,T
hm,0/h f ,0
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To match the change in married men’s relative home hours over 1965 to 2003 from 0.25 to 0.54, given the change in female 
relative wages from 0.57 to 0.78, this requires for the inverse elasticity of substitution ρ = 0.4037. In turn this implies for 







. Restricting zm + z f = 1, men’s productivity in home production 
follows as zm = 0.496 and women’s as z f = 0.504.
In the literature the range of estimates for the labor share in home production is very wide. Studies that include housing 
as capital or equipment used for home production typically ﬁnd a relatively low value, close to the one of market production, 
e.g. Greenwood et al. (1995), while Benhabib et al. (1991), who exclude housing, estimate a very high value of 0.92. In my 
model, the need for home production arises at the margin only from having children (in the household) and does not 
correspond closely to either study. Since parents can acquire home production inputs in the market, such as hiring nannies 
or paid domestic help, the share of time-saving inputs acquired in the market, γ , should be higher than the Benhabib et al.
(1991) value. As a benchmark I consider an intermediate value of γ = 0.29, but I conduct a series of robustness checks in 
section 6.1.
4.3. Home production requirement
The required amount of home production (1), x¯(b) = κ0+κ1b
κ2 is calibrated in two steps, conditional on the home tech-
nology parameters pinned down earlier. First I choose κ0 to ensure that the level of home hours are matched by the model. 
19 I discuss the advantages of using data from the PSID, rather than from the CPS, and compare the data from these two surveys in section A of the online 
appendix.
20 http :/ /www.census .gov /hhes /fertility /data /cps /historical .html.
21 The average age of a mother (total over all birth orders) was 24.9 in 1968 and 27.4 in 2003, according to Vital Statistics of the United States, 2003, 
Volume I, Natality. The average over 1968–2003 is 25.83.
164 C. Siegel / Review of Economic Dynamics 24 (2017) 152–174
Second, I choose the additional home production required when having children, κ1b
κ2 , to replicate some cross-sectional 
variation in home hours.
While the parameterization of the home production technology ensures that relative male home hours are replicated 
by the model, I choose κ0 to match in 1965 the level of male time spent on home production (as a fraction of the time 
endowment of one). This yields κ0 = 0.1693.
To calibrate by how much the need for home production increases due to children, I make use of the observed variation 
of married men’s and women’s home hours against the number of children in the household. In the model, equations 






























































This relationship can be used to infer the home production requirement from the Aguiar and Hurst (2007) data, which 
includes not only time use information, but for some years also respondents’ wages and the number of children in the 
household. Conditional on parameters already calibrated, I can therefore construct the right-hand side of (22). In particular, 
I take Aguiar and Hurst’s data for 1985 and take averages of male and female home hours and wages by the number of 
children in the household. To use the hours data in the model, I transform them into fractions of the total time endowment 
of one. To map the wage data, I divide them by the mean of male wages in this sample, since in the model I ﬁx men’s 
wages to unity (and only let the gender wage gap vary). I construct (22) for households with one child (b = 1) and with 
two children (b = 2) to have a set of two equations in the two unknowns κ1 and κ2 . Solving these gives κ1 = 0.0151 and 
κ2 = 0.419, implying that the need for home production increases in the number of children, but at a decreasing rate.
4.4. Preference parameters
The four parameters of the utility function (4) are left to be chosen. Two parameters, φl and η, relate to the preference 
for leisure, and two parameters, φb and σb , are key for the fertility choice. In 1965, the base year, there are three targets 
left, male labor supply, female labor supply, and fertility.
As home hours are already determined by the parameters set above, targeting market labor is essentially targeting 
leisure time. In the model, male and female labor supply are the solution to (14) and (15), where cm solves (10) and 
θ = 0.5. Therefore I try to replicate male and female time in paid employment, as function of the time endowment of one, 
by choosing the leisure preference parameters. This results in φl = 0.0059 and η= 10.
22
Finally, the two parameters governing fertility have to be chosen. While φb captures the relative weight the household 
attaches to having children (compared to consumption), σb essentially captures the curvature, which is important for the 
magnitude by which fertility responds to changes in female wages. Since 1965 fertility is only one target, I need to add a 
second one. I restrict the calibration by choosing σb such that the lowest fertility the model generates in response to the 
narrowing of the gender wage gap is equal to the lowest married fertility observed, 2.044 (which in the data corresponds 
to 1985). Conditional on a value for σb , I calibrate φb to the fertility data for 1965. Then I solve the model’s transition in 
response to a catching up of women’s relative wages. If the implied minimum fertility is different to the observed one, 
I update the guess for σb until this target is met. This leads to φb = 0.0500 and σb = 0.6434. It is worth noting that I do 
not impose that the model has minimum fertility in the same year as in the data. In fact, under the parameters chosen as 
the baseline calibration, the model matches the lowest fertility when 
w f
wm
= 0.7614, which is in between the values of the 
gender wage gap in 1995 and 2005. The analytical derivations of section 3.3.1 show that the condition (20), for whether 
fertility stops declining or not, is independent of σb (at least when there is no leisure margin). In section 6.1 I perform a 
series of robustness checks, including alternative values for σb (and therefore of φb), which highlight that the value of σb
matters for how strongly fertility decreases or increases, but not for when the fertility decline ends.
Table 2 summarizes all parameters and Table 3 the targeted statistics alongside their model analogue.
5. Quantitative results
5.1. The equilibrium as a function of the gender wage gap
To illustrate the model’s predictions, I ﬁrst show in Fig. 5 the representative couple’s optimal choices as a function of 
female relative wages (on the horizontal axis).
22 While the model gets close, it does not match the 1965 labor supply data perfectly. A perfect match cannot be attained since φl and η impact nm and 
n f symmetrically. However, this deviation is likely to exert only a minor effect on the fertility choice, as the cost of having children does not depend on 
market hours worked.




ρ inv. substitutability at home 0.4037
zm male home labor productivity 0.496
z f female home labor productivity 0.504
γ share of market inputs in home 0.29
x¯(b) amount of home good needed 0.1693+ 0.0151b0.419
φl weight on utility from leisure 0.0059
η curvature of leisure in utility 10
φb weight on utility from children 0.0500
σb curvature of fertility in utility 0.6434
θ husband’s Pareto share 0.5
Table 3
Calibration targets (all for married couples).
1965 – moments to be matched Data Model
Fertility 2.973 2.973
Home hours of men 0.097 0.097
Home hours of women 0.389 0.391
Market hours of men 0.380 0.405
Market hours of women 0.108 0.082
Additional target to be matched
Minimum fertility 2.044 2.044
Fig. 5. Benchmark model’s outcomes against female relative wages. This graph shows the benchmark model’s outcomes against female relative wages (on 
the horizontal axis). The vertical lines correspond to two observed values of female relative wages, the dashed line shows the low value of 1965 and the 
dotted line the higher value of 2005. Home hours and labor supply are shown as fractions of the time endowment of one.
When female relative wages are low, the couple household is very specialized. Based on comparative advantage, the 
wife spends much more time than the husband working in the household, and much less time in paid employment. The 
opportunity cost of having children then depends mainly on the female wage. Improvements in female wages therefore raise 
the couple’s opportunity cost of children substantially. However, they also increase her labor supply and the household’s 
income. Yet, since she worked initially rather little in the market, the impact on household income is relatively small. 
Overall, the calibrated model therefore implies that when female relative wages are low and improve, the channel through 
higher cost is more important, and the substitution effect dominates the income effect, such that fertility falls. While the 
couple optimally reallocates some of the husband’s time to home production, this change in the division of labor helps only 
a little to curb the increase in the cost of children, since his wage rate is substantially higher than hers.
On the contrary, when female relative wages are high and improve further, the cost of having children increases by less. 
On the one hand, reassigning tasks to the husband is relatively cheaper when the gender gap is smaller. On the other hand, 
the wife’s income is a larger fraction of family income, and an improvement in the female wage has a larger effect on 
household resources, which allows for larger substitution of parental time with purchased inputs. This means that at higher 
female relative wages, the substitution effect on the fertility choice becomes weaker relative to the income effect.
In the calibrated model, the income effect overturns the substitution effect before the gender wage gap is fully closed. 
As a consequence, fertility is U-shaped in Fig. 5. Fertility stabilizes in the sense that the initial decline slows down, and 
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Fig. 6. Transition path of the benchmark model. This graph shows the benchmark model’s transition over time that is implied by the narrowing of the 
gender wage gap (upper-left panel). The dotted vertical line corresponds to the last value of the gender wage gap from the data; to the right of it, the 
graph shows predictions if the gap continued to close. Home hours and labor supply are shown as fractions of the time endowment of one. The dotted 
lines show the data.
ultimately turns into an incline. This echoes the analytical results derived in 3.3.1. There I showed, in the absence of a 







> 1 − 2γ , condition (20) holds and fertility is U-shaped in female relative wages.
5.2. The transition in the benchmark model
To compare the model’s prediction against the data, I feed the series of the observed gender wage gap into the model. 
I also explore what the model would imply if the gap continued to close. Fig. 6 shows the implied path of the economy 
since 1965. During the transition, the gender wage gap narrows, as shown in the upper-left panel. The dotted vertical line 
corresponds to the last value of the gender wage gap from the data; to the right of it, the graph shows predictions if the 
gap continued to close at the same rate as it did over 1965–2005. It should be stressed that the forward projection is 
a hypothetical exercise, and it very well might be that the gender wage gap might not shrink any further. In fact, some 
authors (e.g. Blau and Kahn, 2016) have argued that there is evidence for a slowdown, or perhaps even complete stagnation, 
in the narrowing of the gender wage gap in recent years.
As female relative wages improve, the division of labor changes. Initially, fertility declines as raising children becomes 
more costly to the parents. However, fertility bottoms out after an initial decline. While the gender wage gap is closing, 
the model implies a reallocation of labor across gender. When female wages rise, a household ﬁnds it optimal to increase 
the wife’s labor supply and to decrease her time working at home. However, since relative wages have changed, but not 
relative productivities at home, this reallocation entails an increase in men’s home production. Since the opportunity cost of 
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Fig. 7. Transition of the model with zm = 0. For the model without male home production, this graph plots the transition implied by the narrowing of the 
gender wage gap (upper-left panel) over time. The dotted vertical line corresponds to the last value of the gender wage gap from the data; to the right 
of it, the graph shows predictions if the gap continued to close. Home hours and labor supply are shown as fractions of the time endowment of one. The 
dotted lines show the data.
working at home overall increases, the couple also increases their purchases of time-saving inputs by 12.8 percent between 
1965 and 2005. The link between higher female relative wages and lower fertility breaks at some point. In the calibrated 
model fertility stabilizes around 1995 and increases from 2005. As argued in section 5.1 above, the reason is that due to 
the optimal substitutions between the inputs to home production, at suﬃciently low gender wage gaps the implicit cost of 
having children increases by less than household income.
I will show in the next two sections that both the substitutions between male and female time as well as marketization 
are key in understanding why fertility did not fall further.
5.3. Counterfactual: the absence of male home labor
In this part I shut down the rise of male home labor. In the existing literature on fertility it is commonly assumed that 
child-care is a function of female time only. By setting male home productivity to zero, my model nests this as a special 
case. Notice that in this counterfactual exercise, there will be no convergence in the time use of men and women. Even if 
wages were equalized, specialization in the household would persist as men are not productive at home.
As I had calibrated the baseline model under the condition that zm + z f = 1, I set in the counterfactual zm = 0 and 
z f = 1. Then I adjust the weight on children in the utility function such that the household still chooses in 1965 the same 
fertility as in the data.23 This leads to φb = 0.0168. Fig. 7 shows the transition of the model, when men cannot counteract 
23 Since by assumption of zm = 0 this model variant is doomed to fail along the dimension of male home hours, notice that I could not apply the 
calibration strategy of the benchmark model, which has Hm as one of the targets.
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Fig. 8. Transition path of the model with γ = 0. For the model without marketization, this graph plots the transition implied by the narrowing of the 
gender wage gap (upper-left panel) over time. The dotted vertical line corresponds to the last value of the gender wage gap from the data; to the right 
of it, the graph shows predictions if the gap continued to close. Home hours and labor supply are shown as fractions of the time endowment of one. The 
dotted lines show the data.
the fall in women’s home hours. It implies a monotone drop in fertility over the entire series – which is inconsistent with 
the data. Throughout the transition, as female labor supply rises, parents are having fewer and fewer children as child-care 
hours continue to fall. As the wife’s income increases, a couple also acquires more time-saving inputs, but this marketization 
of home production is not strong enough to prevent fertility from falling.24
In fact, the calibrated model with zm = 0 implies a fall in fertility even when female relative wages are close to, or 






γ , which would require a γ > 0.5 to imply a stabilization in fertility before the gender wage gap is closed. 
In the model parameterization, however, γ = 0.29 and, as a consequence, fertility falls throughout. Since the degree of 
marketization is too low, and men are not productive at home, the cost of children increases by more than household 
income when female wages go up. The lack of good substitutes for women’s home hours curbs the increase in female labor 
supply and in total income. As a result, fertility always falls when men do not contribute to home production and the 
gender wage gap narrows.
24 In this counterfactual fertility drops in the long-run to a very low value. The result that fertility keeps falling is not driven by the lack of imposing a 
restriction on the behavior of fertility on the transition path (which pinned down σb as a parameter of the baseline calibration). Section B.1 of the online 
appendix shows that also under an alternative calibration, which imposes this extra target, fertility falls as long as women’s relative wages improve.
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Fig. 9. Comparing the models and the data.
5.4. No marketization of home production
In this section I show that marketization alone is not suﬃcient to generate a recovery of fertility.
To rule out marketization of home production, consider a simpler version of the model in which home production is a 
function of male and female home hours only. This is the special case of γ = 0. Following the calibration strategy used for 
the benchmark model, I adjust some parameters. First, to ensure that this version of the model matches the home hours 
targeted in 1965, I adjust κ0 to 0.1976. Then I choose the fertility preference parameters such that the model replicates the 
1965 fertility statistics as well as a long-run target for fertility. In the calibration of the benchmark, I required the model 
to generate on the transition path the same value of minimum fertility as observed in the data (2.044), which the baseline 
model delivers when 
w f
wm
= 0.7614. To make the two models comparable, I impose that the model with γ = 0 generates at 
this relative wage the same level of fertility, i.e. that b = 2.044 when 
w f
wm
= 0.7614. Together with the 1965 fertility target 
this requires setting φb = 0.0329 and σb = 0.9016.
Fig. 8 shows the transition of this model variant. As in the baseline model, the narrowing of the gender wage gap implies 
a reallocation of home production from women to men, along with a rise in female market labor and a fall in men’s. Fertility 
falls throughout. While the speed of the decline falls as female wages improve, fertility keeps declining. Through the lens 






. Under the calibrated 
parameters, women have a comparative advantage in home production even when wages are equalized. As a consequence, 
the female share in the cost of providing the home good, Cx , is larger than 1/2, whereas the female share in household 
income is at most 1/2. Higher female wages therefore always increase the cost of having children by more than household 
income, and fertility falls.
From the two counterfactual exercises with zm = 0 and with γ = 0, I conclude that neither marketization alone nor 
the rise of male home production by itself is suﬃcient to generate the stabilization of fertility, but that the interaction of 
the two is needed. The magnitude of γ is also important in matching the timing of the fertility transition, as I show in 
section 6.1.
6. Confronting the models and the data
In this section, I compare the predictions of the different versions of the model to each other and to the observed 
variation in the data. Fig. 9 shows the transition paths of the various models and the data for married men and women, 
and Table 4 lists the relative changes from 1965 to 1995, which is the last period for which I can construct married fertility.
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Table 4
Relative changes (in percent) over 1965–1995.
Data Model
Benchmark zm = 0 γ = 0
Fertility −30.2 −29.8 −72.3 −27.4
Nm −4.9 −9.5 −0.8 −11.1
N f +92.4 111.8 25.8 +119.2
Hm +50.8 +35.4 0 +41.7
H f −25.2 −21.6 −11.0 −17.9
This table shows the relative changes of the variables in the different versions of the 
model and in the data over the period 1965–1995. The fertility indicator is ever-married 
40–44 year old women’s number of children-born shifted back by 16 years.
Fig. 10. Sensitivity analysis: varying γ . This graph shows the transition of the model under different values for γ . The models are calibrated individually, 
using the strategy outlined in section 4. The baseline model has γ = 0.29.
The benchmark model performs better than the model version ruling out male participation at home (zm = 0), and than 
the version not allowing for marketization of home production (γ = 0). All models imply initially a fall in fertility and that 
subsequently the decline slows down. But only the full model, which allows for male home production and marketization, 
implies that fertility stops falling before the gender wage gap has closed.
The zm = 0-model as well as the γ = 0-model fail to generate a bottoming out of fertility before the gender wage gap 
has closed. From this I conclude that it is the combination of men contributing more to home production and households 
purchasing more inputs in the market that explains why fertility did not fall further, despite the continued improvement in 
female wages. This also suggests that the analytical results derived in section 3.3 for the simpliﬁed model generalize to the 
full model.
In the zm = 0-model, which rules out male home production, fertility falls initially much faster than in the data. The 
model with γ = 0, which does not allow for marketization of home production or child care, overstates the number of 
children per couple for the ﬁrst decades, but understates the rise in female labor supply and the drop in female home 
labor. However, even the benchmark model predicts that fertility would flatten out later than observed in the data. Under 
the baseline calibration the model predicts fertility to reach its lowest point in 2005, but in the data the lowest value is in 
1985. Since then fertility showed a very modest incline, but virtually remained flat.
Thus, both the rise of male time and the acquisition of time-saving inputs into home production are important in 
understanding why the fertility decline ended. Comparing the γ = 0-model to the benchmark, which uses γ = 0.29, also 
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Fig. 11. Sensitivity analysis: varying σb . This graph shows the transition of the model under different ad-hoc values for σb . All parameters but φb , which is 
adjusted to replicate the 1965 fertility, are taken from the benchmark calibration. The baseline model has σb = 0.6434.
suggests that the higher the share of market inputs into child care, the earlier fertility flattens out. In section 6.1 below, 
I show a sensitivity analysis which conﬁrm this.
6.1. Robustness checks
First, I conduct a sensitivity analysis for the share of market inputs into home production, γ , since in the literature the 
range of estimates is wide, and in my model the interpretation of γ should include all market inputs into home production, 
not only appliances. In the benchmark model I set γ = 0.29, which is larger than the estimate by Benhabib et al. (1991) to 
allow also for a marketization of child care, but below the upper-end value of Greenwood et al. (1995), who include housing 
capital and conclude that market inputs’ share into home production does not differ from the capital share in market output 
(0.36). Since in my model home production is at the margin varying only with child care, which requires mainly human 
time, I only consider lower values (γ < 0.36).
In section 5.4, I have already shown the transition of the model with γ = 0. As a further sensitivity analysis, I also 
calibrate25 models with different values for γ and solve for their transition path. Fig. 10 shows the results. The higher γ , 
the earlier the fertility rate stabilizes, bringing the model even closer to the data. In this sense, the choice of γ = 0.29 in the 
benchmark calibration is therefore conservative. With γ = 0.33, the model matches the fertility response over 1965–1995 
almost perfectly. However, this higher value of γ also implies that fertility responds more strongly at very low or very high 
female relative wages.
Second, I perform a robustness checks on σb , the elasticity of utility with respect to children. For the benchmark model 
I chose σb such that the model generates the lowest level of fertility seen in the data. Now I lift this restriction and instead 
use various ad-hoc values for σb . All other parameters are taken from the benchmark calibration except φb which is adjusted 
such that the model still matches the initial fertility in 1965. As shown in Fig. 11, the higher σb , the less fertility declines 
during the transition and the more stable it is throughout. To replicate the steep decline of fertility in the 1960s, however, 
the model needs a value for σb that is not too high. A very low value of σb , on the other hand, would imply a lower fertility 
than observed most recently. Most importantly, the value of σb has no effect on when the fertility decline stops, but only 
for the amplitude of negative or positive changes.
25 To calibrate the models with different γ I again use the calibration strategy of section 4.
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Fig. 12. Transition path over the 20th century. This graph shows the model’s transition path over the last century that is implied by the narrowing of 
the gender wage gap (upper-left panel). This is based on the benchmark calibration. Home hours and labor supply are shown as fractions of the time 
endowment of one. The dotted lines show the data.
To sum up, whether the fertility decline ends, or not, depends on the home production technology. The conclusions from 
section 3.3 also apply to the full model that allows for a leisure margin. In response to higher female wages, fertility falls 
when the gender wage gap is large, but when the gap is small and there is a suﬃcient amount of complementarity in home 
production and the possibility of some marketization, fertility stabilizes. When γ is high, fertility is predicted to follow a 
pronounced U-shape when female relative wages improve further, whereas for smaller γ there is only a modest rise.
6.2. The 20th century
To analyze how my explanation performs over the longer time series, I take the model’s benchmark calibration (i.e. the 
parameters calibrated to 1965 as described above), and simulate the implied transition path when starting the economy in 
1900. To do this, drawing on data sources from above is insuﬃcient, as for one the time use surveys started only in 1965. 
I therefore make use of additional data sources. For a longer time series on home production I take data from Ramey (2009)
and for market hours worked from Ramey and Francis (2009). As a fertility indicator I use Jones and Tertilt (2008)’s data 
for married women’s children ever born. Since they construct this series by mothers’ birth cohort, I shift it by 27 years. I do 
this as Jones and Tertilt report that cohort children ever born when shifted by 27 years displays similar trends to the total 
fertility rate. All these series are needed to evaluate the model predictions. In addition, I need pre-1965 data on relative 
wages to feed into the model. These I take from Fernández (2013), which are based on Goldin (1990).
Fig. 12 shows the results. The model does well in replicating the overall trends in male and female work in the market 
and at home. More importantly, it performs well in terms of fertility. At the beginning of the century fertility dropped 
when female wages improved. But when in the aftermath of the second world war women’s relative earnings on average 
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declined, fertility temporarily increased, consistent with the baby boom we see in the data.26 Subsequently, with the further 
improvement in female relative wages fertility declined further. Hence, also in the ﬁrst half of the last century the model 
performs well in replicating the data. It can explain the secular decline in fertility and yet allow for the baby boom, as both 
are linked to movements in women’s relative wages at times when the gender wage gap was large, and women therefore 
shouldered most of home production and of the cost of having children. Then the fertility decision depended mostly on 
the market value of women’s time. However, as argued in section 5 the model performs well also in the second half of the 
last century. Then the gender wage gap was already fairly small and when it shrank further, fertility flattened out as men 
started to supply more hours to home production.
7. Conclusion
In this paper I argue that the common force behind the observed trends in fertility and hours worked is the narrowing 
of the gender wage gap. I present a model in which having children increases the need for home production, and in which 
rising female relative wages have not only direct effects on employment, but also reallocate hours worked at home from 
women to men. Initially, because of the gender wage gap, women shoulder most of home production. When the wage 
gap shrinks, women’s labor supply increases and total home production falls. Since men’s wages are considerably higher 
than their wives, they are not fully offsetting the drop in women’s time working at home. Instead, fertility falls. However, 
the narrower the gender wage gap, the smaller the scope for specialization in the household. When female relative wages 
improve further, the opportunity cost of having children increases relatively little, as reallocating home hours from women 
to men is not as costly anymore. I show that the fertility decline ends when female relative wages are still improving, 
provided that complementarities between both parents’ time working at home are suﬃciently strong and it is possible for 
a couple to substitute some of their time for purchased inputs.
Qualitatively the model predictions are consistent with the data for the U.S. After an initial steep decline, fertility sta-
bilizes before the gender wage gap has fully closed. The model also implies the secular rise of male home production and 
a fall in female time spent working at home. However, the model generates the end of the fertility decline later than ob-
served in the data. I ﬁnd that a higher use of parental time-saving inputs into home production helps in matching the 
timing. However, a marketization of home production alone is not suﬃcient. Both the rise in male home production and 
marketization are key in explaining why fertility did not decline further. Since in my model the condition for the fertility 
stabilization depends only on the home production and child care technology, it suggests that cross-country differences in 
whether the fertility decline ended, or not, might be due to differences in marketization rates.
Appendix A. Supplementary material
Supplementary material related to this article can be found online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2017.01.010.
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